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Abstract: Identity politics has been critiqued in various ways. One central problem—the 
Reinforcement Problem—claims that identity politics reinforces groups rooted in 
oppression thereby undermining its own liberatory aims. Here I consider two versions of  the 
problem—one psychological and one metaphysical. I defang the first by drawing on work in 
social psychology. I then argue that careful consideration of  the metaphysics of  social 
groups and of  the practice of  identity politics provides resources to dissolve the second 
version. Identity politics involves the creation or transformation of  groups in ways that do 
not succumb to the metaphysical Reinforcement Problem. 
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Identity politics has been critiqued in many ways. It has been argued that it confuses victimization 
with expertise and that it promotes tribalism. It has been claimed to reinforce oppression, 
essentialize, be exclusionary and non-intersectional. Others argue that identity politics fails to unify 
around shared liberal values, that it does not adequately recognize class disparities, and that it 
promotes tokenism in representation. Here I argue one central problem for identity politics can be 
diffused by examining the metaphysics of  social groups and how identity politics was intended to be 
practiced. The Reinforcement Problem claims that identity politics reinforces group identities that 
are rooted in oppression.  Liberatory socio-political aims cannot be achieved while reinforcing 1
oppressive hierarchies. There is, the objection goes, something paradoxical at the very core of  
identity politics. So, identity politics should be abandoned.  
 While there might be good reasons to be wary of  identity politics, we ought to be clear on 
what objections have bite. By showing that identity politics can be defended from one challenge—a 
challenge that questions not just its consequences but its constitutive nature—we can better 
understand what is at stake in defending or objecting to the social political strategy. Moreover, our 
inquiry will serve to highlight connections between views on the nature of  groups and projects in 
the political sphere.  
 Bhambra and Margee call this “the problem of  the reification of  politicised identities” (2010: 62).1
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 The paper is structured as follows. First, I briefly consider what identity politics is (§I). Then, 
I outline and motivate two versions of  the Reinforcement Problem for identity politics (§II). The 
primary aim of  the paper is to show that a constitutive metaphysical version of  the Reinforcement 
Problem can be avoided through careful consideration of  social metaphysics and the metaphysical 
upshot of  political projects. However, before turning to that task, I show that a psychological 
version of  the Reinforcement Problem can be largely defanged given results in social psychology 
(§III). I then turn to social metaphysics. I sketch a view of  social structures and offer a structuralist 
account of  two sorts of  social groups (§IV). I argue that social metaphysics provides resources for 
identity politics to avoid the Reinforcement Problem (§V). Identity politics often does involve 
bolstering groups, but it need not (and as best practiced does not) reinforce those rooted in 
oppression. Instead it involves the formation of  new groups based on intentional and overt 
commitments to values, projects, and political goals. Identity politics involves the active and 
intentional transformation of  the social world. Attending to the nature of  groups provides a route 
for avoiding a central problem plaguing identity politics. Finally (§VI) I offer concluding remarks. 
I. What is Identity Politics? 
Attacks on identity politics are pervasive. So, one might assume that what identity politics is is well 
understood. Often, however, this is not so. Alcoff  states that “[o]ne of  the problems is that identity 
politics is nowhere defined—nor is its historical genesis elaborated—by its detractors. So the very 
thing we are discussing is surprisingly vague” (2000: 313). Here I briefly examine the historical roots 
of  identity politics to argue for a way of  understanding it. In addition to being rooted in historical 
usage, the conception I rely on makes manifest the worry posed by the Reinforcement Problem.  
 In its historical roots and how it is best practiced today, identity politics involves political 
mobilization around certain groups or identities. Heyes states that “[w]hat is crucial about the 
“identity” of  identity politics appears to be the experience of  the subject, especially his or her 
experience of  oppression and the possibility of  a shared and more authentic or self-determined 
alternative” (2018). Importantly it is not just about identity as an individual experience. That is, it is 
not about a person turning inward to focus solely on their felt identity.  Identity, in this sense, might 2
be part of  identity politics, but groups and larger coalitions of  groups have and continue to be 
 Lilla (2017) takes identity politics (or what he calls ‘identity liberalism’) to involve a “special snowflake” largely 2
solipsistic and individualistic worldview. Historically, this is not what identity politics is, even if  some who practice what 
they label as identity politics fits this notion.
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central to identity politics. It aims at using identity groups to argue for anti-racist, anti-
heteronormative, anti-patriarchal, and other anti-oppression aims. 
 In the locus classicus of  the expression identity politics the Combahee River Collective, a Black 
feminist group, argue that “focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of  
identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics come 
directly out of  our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else’s oppression” (1979). 
They argue that focusing on their oppression will promote ending oppression in general stating “[i]f  
Black women were free, it would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom 
would necessitate the destruction of  all the systems of  oppression” (1979). As proposed by the 
Combahee River Collective, identity politics is intersectional and has broad non-exclusionary 
emancipatory aims.  
 Identity politics involves political mobilization striving towards liberating groups that have 
been oppressed. For instance, while CEOs can lobby for their interests, they do not form an 
oppressed group so they would not thereby be engaged in identity politics. Moreover, it seems 
implausible that being a CEO is an identity in the same sense that racial and gender identities are. 
Alcoff  takes social identities to have “causal determinacy over our epistemic and political 
orientations to the world… [and] profoundly affect how we are seen and interacted with by 
others” (2006: 90). Some identities are visible and others are not or are to a lesser degree. For 
instance, being an opera singer or doctor are less visible than racial and gender identities. Alcoff  
states that “our ‘visible’ and acknowledged identity affects our relations in the world, which in turn 
affects our interior life, that is, our lived experience or subjectivity” (2006: 92). How one is racialized 
(in a context) has profound effects on one’s experiences and perhaps on one’s inner life. Being an 
opera singer, a CEO, or a doctor are roles that one plays. These roles certainly have effects on a 
person, but they do not have widespread effects on our actions, the norms we are subject to, and 
how we are treated across contexts in the ways that racial or gender identities do.  
 While there is certainly more that could be said about the way roles affect identities, the main 
upshot to draw from the preceding discussion is that identity politics is focused on identity groups 
that are related to oppression. This leads to the question as to whether identity group must actually 
be oppressed or whether group members believing that they are oppressed is sufficient. For instance, 
whites (those with a white identity) qua being white are not oppressed in contemporary American 
society. If  actually being oppressed is required for identity politics, then there are is no white identity 
politics. If, in contrast, belief  that the group is oppressed is what is required, then there could be 
white identity politics. Given that here we are considering the force of  the Reinforcement Problem, 
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our focus is on identity politics as carried out by groups that actually are oppressed. If  a group is not 
actually oppressed, it cannot reinforce its own oppression. Reinforcement requires that there is 
something there to reinforce to begin with.  
 On its historical conception, identity politics involves mobilizing around social groups 
rooted in oppression in order to achieve liberatory aims. The sorts of  anti-oppressive aims that 
identity politics involves come in two broad sorts. The first involves valorizing, bolstering, or 
supporting a group. This might be done through working to emphasize group perspectives, interests, 
or experiences. The second sort of  aims carried out by projects in identity politics involve seeking to 
eliminate certain groups. For instance, one might aim at eradicating gender or racial groups through 
broad social restructuring. Both aims rely on the existence of  identity groups. The paradoxical 
tension of  the Reinforcement Problem looms. Can identity groups that are grounded in oppression 
be appealed to or banded around as part of  a social justice project? Might identity politics merely 
reinforce oppression? 
II. The Reinforcement Problem 
The Reinforcement Problem has been posed in recent articles as a part of  a larger criticism 
purporting that identity politics promotes tribalism and confuses victimhood and knowledge. For 
instance, in the National Review, David French states “Identity politics… exploits suffering for the 
sake of  power. Ambitious politicians hitch their wagons to other people’s pain.” In a column in The 
New York Times, David Brooks argues “From an identity politics that emphasized our common 
humanity, we’ve gone to an identity politics that emphasizes having a common enemy. On campus 
these days, current events are often depicted as pure power struggles—oppressors acting to preserve 
their privilege over the virtuous oppressed.” Both columnists hint at the Reinforcement Problem. 
The problem is not just posed in popular media, but is seriously considered by theorists in feminist 
philosophy and legal and political theory.  
 Linda Alcoff, Kimberle Crenshaw, and Iris Marion Young suggest, although do not endorse,  3
the Reinforcement Problem in more straightforward terms. For instance, Alcoff  states “if  identity is 
something created by oppression then our goal should be to dismantle [identities] rather than 
celebrate or build a politics around [them]” (2000: 319). Crenshaw states “[r]ace, gender, and other 
identity categories are most often treated in mainstream liberal discourse as vestiges of  bias or 
 Alcoff ’s treatment of  the worry is discussed in §V. Crenshaw argues for intersectionality as a way to avoid the worry. 3
Young argues that “it is foolish to deny the reality of  groups” and argues that group identifications can be important to 
many people (1990: 47), so she finds the argument wanting. 
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domination… According to this understanding, our liberatory objective should be to empty such 
categories of  any social significance” (1991: 279). Young says that “Oppression, on [one] view, is 
something that happens to people when they are classified in groups … Eliminating oppression thus 
requires eliminating groups” (1990: 47). Each of  these worries points to the view that identity 
politics that involves banding around oppressive groups will reinforce rather than reduce oppressive 
social structures. 
 The Reinforcement Problem is both posed and endorsed by the political scientist Wendy 
Brown. She argues (1995: 73) that  
In its emergence as a protest against marginalization or 
subordination, politicized identity thus becomes attached to its own 
exclusion both because it is premised on this exclusion for its very 
existence as identity and because the formation of  identity at the site 
of  exclusion, as exclusion, augments or ‘alters the direction of  the 
suffering’ entailed in subordination or marginalization by finding a 
site of  blame for it. 
She goes on to say “[p]olitical identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by 
entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in its politics; it can hold out no future—
for itself  or others—that triumphs over this pain” (1995: 74). Identity politics should be avoided, 
she argues, as its foundations involve oppression in a way that necessitate the maintenance and 
reinforcement of  the exclusion and oppression it supposedly aims to obliterate. Bhambra and 
Margree argue that Brown takes identity politics to operate “to maintain and reproduce the identity 
created by injury (exclusion) rather than—and indeed, often in opposition to—resolving the 
injurious social relations that generated claims around that identity in the first place” (2010: 62). I’ll 
formulate the problem as follows: 
The Reinforcement Problem (RP): Identity politics involves (further) 
reinforcement or reification of  groups based on bias, oppression, and 
disenfranchisement and, thus, cannot be part of  a successful 
liberatory project.  
My primary aim here is to show the practice of  identity politics is not antithetical to social justice 
aims. In order to show that this, we need to further clarify the Reinforcement Problem.  
 Notice that the RP as formulated above ends with the claim that identity politics cannot be 
part of  a successful social justice project. If  it is merely possible but quite unlikely for identity 
politics to reinforce oppression, that does not yet give us reason to avoid identity politics itself. 
Rather, it provides reason to consider other liberatory political practices and to weigh the pitfalls 
 5
they bring with those that identity politics can bring. We might conclude that identity politics still 
ought to be practiced, but in ways that are careful to avoid the Reinforcement Problem.  
 Consider an analogous argument: Writing can reinforce oppression. Therefore, writing 
cannot be part of  a successful liberatory project and, if  we are aimed at promoting justice, we ought 
to avoid writing. This argument is obviously invalid. While it is certainly true that writing can 
reinforce oppression, that does not entail that writing could not also be part of  a liberatory project 
(it can be!). The argument fails to support the conclusion that we should avoid completely writing or 
that there is something about the nature of  writing that is oppressive. The RP can only show that 
identity politics should be avoided full stop if  it is impossible or unlikely for one to engage without 
reinforcing oppression. If  the RP is to undermine the practice of  identity politics, it needs to be read 
as a claim that identity politics is sufficient for or makes it likely the reinforcement of  oppressive 
systems. If  that is the case, then identity politics should be avoided. Here our focus is on this strong 
claim. 
 There are two versions of  the RP that need to be considered. The first is psychological. It 
states that identity politics as it is practiced by us is sufficient to reinforce oppression. If  it turns out 
that given human psychology, identity politics always or is overwhelmingly likely to reinforce 
oppression, we ought to avoid identity politics.  The second is constitutive; its target is the nature of  4
identity politics itself. The constitutive version of  the RP is a metaphysical problem—one that takes 
identity politics to be an active route to the continued persistence of  oppressive identity groups 
thereby working  to reinforce oppression.  
 Determining whether identity politics succumbs to either version of  the RP requires 
answering different questions. Addressing the psychological version of  the RP involves considering 
(i) empirical questions about the psychological affects of  identity politics and emphasizing group 
identity and (ii) theoretical questions about the relationship between psychological states and 
oppression.  Answering the constitutive version of  the RP requires addressing metaphysical 5
questions about the nature of  certain sorts of  political projects, the groups they involves, and their 
effects on the existence and nature of  groups. My main focus here is on the constitutive version of  
the RP as the psychological RP requires answering open empirical questions that go beyond what 
can be done in a philosophy paper. I do, however, offer reasons to doubt that the psychological RP 
is damning to identity politics. We turn to those next. 
 Thanks Robin Dembroff  for suggesting considering the psychological version of  the RP. 4
 Thanks to Jonathan Kwan for comments that helped draw out this point.5
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III. Defanging the Psychological Reinforcement Problem  
Evidence from social psychology can be used to call into doubt the view that identity politics elicits 
negative psychological effects. There is overwhelming evidence that humans tend to favor ingroup 
members over outsiders (e.g., Tajfel, et. al. (1971); Dunham (2018)). Ingroup bias reveals itself  in 
along various dimensions. For instance it manifests itself  in preference for ingroup members, in the 
extent to which one empathizes with another, and in the extent to which one attributes humanity to 
a person (Cikara et. al. (2011); Haslam & Loughnan (2014); Kteily & Bruneau (2017)). While the 
finding that there is strong tendency to have ingroup biases is robust, a group’s status in society also 
affects implicit ingroup and outgroup biases. For instance, studies have found that individuals in 
lower status racial groups (e.g., Black Americans) have little or no implicit ingroup bias towards their 
own racial group and may even have implicit biases towards privileged outgroups (e.g., towards white 
Americans) (Nosek, et. al. (2002); Rudman et al. (2002)). To engage with the empirical questions 
underlying the psychological RP we need evidence about the effects that highlighting a socially 
stigmatized group identity has on attitudes. 
 Recent research showed that college students at a historically black college (HBC) had 
implicit pro-Black biases that their peers at colleges that are racially heterogeneous did not (Gibson 
et. al. (2017)). Gibson et. al. found that students at HBCs reported a stronger sense of  belonging to 
their racial group. They also found a positive correlation between strength of  sense of  belonging 
and implicit pro-Black biases. In a study on reasons why students chose to attend historically Black 
colleges and universities, van Camp et. al. (2009) found that students emphasized racial self  
development and the race focus of  the institution (e.g., in terms of  classes and student body). If  the 
psychological construal of  the RP were correct, we would expect that sustained emphasis on racial 
identity would reinforce attitudes connected to oppression. For instance, in this case we would 
expect that being in an educational setting focused on Black identity would further diminish ingroup 
biases towards Black people or augment implicit pro-White attitudes. Yet, Gibson et. al. (2017) 
found the exact opposite. In settings in which Black identity is highlighted, implicit ingroup bias was 
higher. While there are many factors at play, the studies provide some evidence that being in a setting 
that emphasizes Black identity can have positive psychological effects.  
 Studies on the appropriation of  slurs provide further evidence that identifying using 
derogatory terms mitigate rather than reinforce oppressive attitudes. Researchers found  that when 
an ingroup member self  labels with a slur it increases both a speaker’s sense of  their own power and 
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others’ perceptions of  the speaker’s power and of  the group targeted by the slur (Galinsky et. al. 
(2013)). For instance, after self-labeling with bitch, women are apt to feel more powerful. Those who 
witnessed the self-labeling also judge the self-labeler and women in general to be more powerful 
than in circumstances that did not involve labeling with a slur. While identity politics involves more 
than reappropriating slurs, the finding that using explicitly derogatory terms can increase perceptions 
of  power provides evidence that banding around an oppressive group can have psychological effects 
that promote feelings and perceptions of  power in marginalized groups.  
 Evidence from social psychology points towards the view that highlighting identity can lead 
to changes in ingroup biases, a sense of  belonging, and perceptions of  power. Research on the 
relationship between self-esteem, group identification, and attitudes, shows that increases in positive 
attitudes towards one’s group are correlated with increases in self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner (1986); 
Greenwald et. al. (2002)). This suggests that increased ingroup bias would be correlated with 
increased self-esteem. To see how the experimental findings might undermine the psychological RP, 
let’s turn to the relationship between psychological states and oppression. 
 Oppression can have a multitude of  psychological effects. Sandra Bartky states that “[t]o be 
psychologically oppressed is to be weighed down in your mind; it is to have a harsh dominion 
exercised over your self-esteem” (1990: 22). It involves an internalization of  feelings of  inferiority in 
terms of  autonomy, rationality, and reliability. The studies considered here provide evidence that 
emphasizing group identity may reduce feelings of  inferiority and promote a sense of  belonging, 
strength, and positive attitudes towards one’s group. That is, we have reason to think that 
emphasizing identity could mitigate psychological oppression. Marginalization and powerlessness are 
two central characteristics of  oppression (Young 1990). We saw that highlighting identities rooted in 
oppression can diminish the ways these manifest psychologically again potentially working to 
undermine oppression. 
 Yet, oppression is not just psychological; is also structural and material (e.g., Frye 1983, 
Young 1990). Moreover, some psychological effects that might appear positive can in actuality work 
to further enshrine oppressive systems.  For instance, oppressed people might form adaptive 6
preferences in which they come to prefer oppressive conditions even though they are inconsistent 
with flourishing (Khader 2011). Having high self-esteem is plausibly central to human flourishing. 
While preferences for ingroup members can surely contribute to oppression, the sorts of  
preferences that would do so are those that involve bias towards privileged groups. For instance, 
white, Black, or brown people having pro-white attitudes could contribute to white supremacy. We 
 Thanks to Jonathan Kwan for pressing this worry.6
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saw that when Black identity is highlighted at HBCUs, Black people had stronger implicit pro-Black 
rather than pro-white attitudes. Highlighting Black identity looks to mitigate the strength of  what we 
might call “adaptive implicit attitudes,” which some Black and brown people had outside of  HBCU 
settings.  
 More research is needed to on the psychological effects of  identity politics and on how these 
relate to structural oppression. Here I have offered evidence that emphasizing group identities can 
work to promote self-esteem, a sense of  belonging, and feelings of  power. These are antithetical to 
promoting oppression. The psychological RP is partially defanged. 
 The second version of  the RP is not empirical or about the connection between 
psychological states and oppression. The constitutive version of  the RP poses a metaphysical 
challenge for identity politics. In the remainder of  the paper I argue that the constitutive 
Reinforcement Problem can be avoided by considering the nature of  different sorts of  social groups 
and the effects identity politics has on group persistence and identity. 
IV. Views of  Groups and Distinctions in Social Structures  
In other work I develop a structuralist account social groups (Ritchie 2013, 2015, forthcoming). 
Here I outline the elements of  the metaphysical framework needed to combat the constitutive RP.  
 Social structures are structures that constitutively depend on social factors. A structure is a 
network of  relations. Structures in this sense can be represented as (although not identified with) 
graphs composed of  nodes and edges. Nodes represent positions or places that can be occupied by 
entities. They are defined in terms of  (i) the relations they bear to other nodes and (ii) (possibly null) 
restrictions on occupiers.  Edges represent relations that hold between nodes (or node-occupiers). 7
For instance in the figure below, the nodes are labeled A-F and the relations between them, of  which 
there might be many, are represented by directed edges. 
  
 Koslicki (2008) argues for a view of  structures that include type restrictions for occupants of  positions in a 7
structure must satisfy.
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 fig. 1—simple directed graph  
A structure, S, constitutively depends on social factors just in case: (i) in defining what it is to be S 
reference must be made to some social factors or (ii) social factors are metaphysically necessary for S 
to exist or (iii) social factors ground the existence of  S (or the fact that S exists).   8
 Social factors include social beliefs, systems, patterns, conventions, processes, actions, rules, 
norms, properties, facts, and arrangements. Rather than attempting to give an analysis of  social 
factors, I point to illustrative examples. Constitutions and charters are social. Legal adoption is 
social. Being working class, being Norwegian, and being Prime Minister are social. Systems of  class, race, and 
gender are social. Dollar bills, universities, and basketball teams are social. The economy, economic 
growth, and money are social. The fact that the NBA has two conferences is social. The convention 
of  giving gifts on birthdays is social. 
 Social structures can differ in two ways that are relevant for our purposes. First, epistemic 
access to a structure’s dependence on social factors can be obvious or not. Something’s dependency 
on social factors is overt if  its dependence is or can be “openly acknowledged” (Griffiths 1997: 
147). In contrast, something’s dependency on social factors is covert if  it is taken to be wholly 
natural and independent of  social factors. Organizational structures of  government bodies are overt; 
gender or class structures might be covert. Second, a structure can be intentionally or unintentionally 
instantiated. A structure is intentionally instantiated when some people intend to instantiate it, 
perhaps by intending to play certain roles. Otherwise it is unintentionally instantiated. Structures 
of  clubs or teams are plausibly intentionally instantiated, while caste structures might be (at least 
partially) unintentionally instantiated. 
 The view of  social structures just sketched can be used to give accounts of  two sorts of  
social groups. Feature social groups—for example gender and racial groups—have members that 
are (taken to) share some features. They are a variety of  social kind. I use ‘shared feature’ in a way 
that is very broadly construed. Views on what features are relevant might be more or less mind-
independent and more or less intrinsic or relational.  
 Recall that nodes in social structures are defined in terms of  relations and restrictions on 
node occupiers. They allow for features that are intrinsic as well as features that are relational. They 
provide us with resources to capture a range of  views of  gender, racial, and other feature groups. In 
Ritchie (forthcoming) I argue that feature social groups are nodes in social structures. More 
 I develop this definition in Ritchie (forthcoming). It is an adaptation of  views of  constitutive social 8
construction proposed by Haslanger (2003: 318) and Mallon (2014).
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specifically, they are nodes in social structures that restrict occupation to people (or other social 
creatures) and which allow for multiple occupiers at a time and world. 
 To illustrate the view of  feature social groups in a way that is too simplistic, but will be 
useful for getting the view on the table let’s consider gender groups. Again, to allow for greater 
clarity while keeping the discussion fairly simple, I adopt a particular view of  gender groups 
(Haslanger (2000)). I am not arguing that this view is correct, but it will make the illustration clearer 
to adopt a specific view. Haslanger argues that “S is a woman iff  S is systematically subordinated 
along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.) and S is 'marked' as a target for this 
treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of  a female's biological 
role in reproduction” (2000, 39). Given this view, the feature group women is a node in a social 
structure defined in terms of  subordination and restrictions on occupiers of  nodes (i.e., having 
certain observed or imagined to have bodily features). The example illustrates how the view that 
feature social groups are nodes in social structures can be applied. 
 Feature groups are often in structures that are covert. For instance, many take gender, race, 
castes, or economic classes to be natural and not socially dependent. They are also often (perhaps in 
part due to being part of  covert structures) unintentionally instantiated. 
 In Ritchie (2013, forthcoming) I argue that organized social groups—like teams and 
committees—are structured wholes. They are particulars with internal structures  and members that 9
occupy nodes in their structures. A group’s organizational structure involves roles that can be 
represented as nodes with relations between them. Consider, again in toy form, an organizing 
committee for a political group. The committee might have a chair, a treasurer, a secretary, a 
mobilizing coordinator, and a social media coordinator. The structure can be represented as 
involving nodes for each role. Organized group structures are plausibly overt and intentionally 
instantiated.  
 As in all structures, nodes in organized group structures are defined in terms of  relations 
and restrictions on occupation. All nodes in the structures of  organized social groups require that 
they be occupied by a person (or social creature). They might also place restrictions on an occupiers’ 
age, citizenship, gender, etc. Relations that define nodes can hold between nodes in the structure 
(e.g., the treasurer might report to the chair) or to other entities (e.g., the social media coordinator 
bears relations to social media platforms like Twitter). Relations might require certain actions. They 
could also involve norms. For instance, someone might be normatively bound by the node they 
 They may also be positioned in larger structures. 9
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occupy even if  they are not always carrying out the requisite action or if  they fail to “live up to” the 
demands of  the position.  
 Organized groups have structures; they are not merely structures. They are structures that 
have been realized by individuals. Both structures and members matter for their persistence and 
identity conditions. Some individuals realize a structure and are the members of  an organized group 
by collectively occupying the nodes in the structure by bearing the relations the nodes require. 
 The exposition of  social structures and social groups given here will suffice for the purposes 
of  our objective—to show that the Reinforcement Problem can be avoided through appeal to the 
metaphysics of  social groups. There may be other accounts of  the metaphysics of  groups that could 
also provide ways to avoid the Reinforcement Problem. I am not arguing that a structuralist 
metaphysics is the only way to dissolve the problem. Rather, it is to use the resources of  a particular 
metaphysical view to demonstrate how social metaphysics provides resources to diffuse a central 
problem posed against identity politics. 
V. Dissolving the Reinforcement Problem—Social Metaphysics at Work 
The Reinforcement Problem claimed that identity politics involves further reinforcement or 
reification of  certain identity groups—like racial and gender groups. To use the terminology from 
the last section, it involves the claim that certain sorts of  feature groups are reinforced. If  the 
Reinforcement Problem is to have any bite, some feature groups must metaphysically depend on 
relations of  oppression, bias, or disenfranchisement. Let me explain. If  identity groups were not 
intimately related to oppression at all, then banding around them would fail be sufficient for 
reinforcing oppression. By way of  comparison suppose that wearing red sneakers is not related to 
oppression. Then, coming together with other red sneaker wearers will not be sufficient nor will it 
make it likely that oppression is reinforced. Certainly it is possible that red sneaker wearers will end 
up oppressing others, but there is nothing about red sneaker wearing in and of  itself  that further 
entrenches injustice. There is no intimate connection between reinforcing a group that is not 
connected to oppression and reinforcing oppression. If  identity groups are not at least partially 
dependent on oppression,  the Reinforcement Problem is sidestepped.  10
 This provides the first metaphysical strategy for avoiding the constitutive RP. If  identity 
groups are not metaphysically dependent on oppression, the constitutive RP is avoided. Yet, the 
view that racial, gender, and other groups are constitutively dependent on relations of  oppression is 
 For arguments that gender identity should be understood as distinct from gender as a position in a social 10
structure see, e.g., Jenkins (2016). 
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prominent in feminist and critical theory (e.g., Hardimon (2014), Haslanger (2000), Mills (1998)). 
Here I argue that even if  identity politics involves identity groups that are dependent on oppression, 
the RP can be avoided. 
 Consider identity politics as carried out by Black Lives Matter. On their website they state 
“Four years ago, what is now known as the Black Lives Matter Global Network began to organize. It 
started out as a chapter-based, member-led organization whose mission was to build local power and 
to intervene when violence was inflicted on Black communities by the state and vigilantes.”  The 11
organization is a network of  organized groups. It currently includes 20 chapters. Some of  their 
members have defined leadership roles. BLM has founders (Patrisse Khan-Cullors, Alicia Garza, and 
Opal Tometi) and a full-time staff. It is not a feature group. It is not a social kind. Feature groups are 
not the sorts of  entities that are founded. They do not have chapters. They are not staffed. For 
instance, the social group women does not have a staff. It was not founded in the 1700s.  
 A movement like BLM does not involve merely reinforcing a feature group that is a node in 
a structure that is (largely) composed of  oppressive hierarchical relations. The organization is not 
just based on shared social position, but involves organizing and mobilizing. It involved the creation 
of  various organized chapters in cities and states across the United States. While their foci are 
different, the Black Lives Matter Global Network resembles the structure of  a league of  teams (e.g., 
the National Basketball Association) much more than a social kind like African Americans, Blacks, 
or women. Insofar as identity politics involves forming organized groups, it fails to involve just 
reinforcing feature groups in oppressive power structures. The social structuralist view of  social 
groups provides resources to show that identity politics does not merely involve reinforcing groups 
constituted (in part) by subordination or domination.  
 In order for new organized groups to avoid reinforcing oppressive groups, the metaphysics 
of  feature groups is also relevant. If  the organized group was aimed at maintaining a group linked to 
bias, oppression, and domination, then the RP would rear its head again. At the end of  section I I 
noted that projects in identity politics have two types of  aims—eliminativist and valorizing. Identity 
politics with eliminativist aims seeks to destabilize and ultimately abolish certain identity groups 
through social restructuring. Identity politics of  this sort involves appealing to racial, gender, or 
other identity groups as part of  a political project that will ultimately lead to their destruction. It 
involves a strategic reliance on identity groups in a way analogous to strategic uses of  essentialism 
(Spivak 1996).  
 Retrieved from https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what-we-believe/ on January 10, 2019.11
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 Identity politics with abolitionist aims can avoid the constitutive RP. The aims of  the 
political project is not to reinforce or form further attachments to a group. While identity politics 
with eliminativist aims may face the psychological RP and there may be worries about its viability as 
a strategy, it does not face the constitutive RP. To draw the point out further, compare abolitionist 
identity politics with a group aimed at eradicating malaria. If  its aims are met, malaria is eliminated, 
not reinforced. Even if  the groups appealed to by abolitionist identity politics are rooted in 
oppression, the strategy does not seek to reinforce groups. So the worry that further reification of  
groups elicits more oppression does not arise.  12
 Second, identity politics might have valorizing aims to support and bolster identity groups 
and emphasize group perspectives, experiences, and values. To avoid the constitutive RP, identity 
politics with valorizing aims must involve feature group transformation. 
 Feminist philosophers have argued against the view that identity politics involves merely 
banding together around oppressive categories or social groups. For instance, Alcoff  argues that “a 
realistic identity politics … is one that recognizes the dynamic, variable, and negotiated character of  
identity” (2000: 341). In a similar vein Young argues that “those who identify with a group can 
redefine the meaning and norms of  a group identity” and that “oppressed groups have sought to 
confront their oppression by engaging in just such redefinition” (1990: 46). Feature groups or social 
identity categories that depend on shared positionality might be a starting point for identity politics, 
but they are not the end point of  identity politics.  
 Ann Ferguson (1996, 1998) argues that identity politics should focus on “building bridge 
identities,” which require those involved to “reconstitute” identities rather than “reaffirming or 
revalorizing them as essentialist identity politics supposes” (1996: 580). Again, we are seeing that 
identity politics is taken to be about renegotiation, creation, or transformation. She goes on to 
suggest that “[w]e can develop an identity politics … by agreeing with others defined by a similar 
positionality to fight for certain social justice demands, such as abortion rights, freedom from male 
violence, affordable childcare, or adequate research on women's health issues” (Ferguson 1996: 581). 
These political aims and a vantage point that recognizes certain wrongs, biases, and forms of  
 Thanks to Katharine Jenkins for helpful discussion and suggestions on this point.12
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oppression might be rooted in being a member of  a certain feature group, but these do not just “fall 
out of ” being positioned in a particular way. Rather they take discussion, education, and theorizing.  13
 Gurminder Bhambra and Victoria Margree argue that “[w]hile a recognition of  historical 
(and contemporary) suffering is an important aspect of  the political process of  seeking redress for 
the conditions of  suffering, it does not constitute identity singularly” (2010: 65). They argue that 
taking identity politics to involve an attachment to oppressive categories fails “to recognise (or 
accept) the processes of  change associated with movements” (ibid.). Like Alcoff, Young, and 
Ferguson, they stress that identity politics involves movements that aim at change and the 
destruction of  groups centered on or grounded in oppression.  
 To give a final example, Allison Weir argues that identity politics is about transformation. 
She states (2008: 119) 
[i]dentity politics has always been a complex process involving 
finding ourselves identified as belonging to a particular category 
(women, blacks, gays), and identifying with these particular “we’s,” 
and constructing our identity through active processes of  resistance, 
of  making meaning, through political struggle, through 
identifications with each other, through creating new narratives, and 
thereby (re)creating ourselves, and our identities.  
If  identity politics is about transforming or creating new identities from which to develop political 
platforms, how might the views and tools from social metaphysics prove useful?  
 Let’s consider an example to help answer the question. Suppose we start with the simplified 
view that the feature groups women and men are nodes in a structure defined in terms of  
subordination and privilege as in Haslanger’s (2000) definition given above. Then suppose some 
individuals who are women begin to engage in identity politics. They develop shared aims in 
overturning laws and in providing better legal protections for abortion rights. They work with those 
in the LGBTQA+ community to defend partner rights and accessibility and inclusion. And so on. 
The group is still a feature social group. It involves relations to other groups. It might involve 
relations to petitions and laws. It requires that one have several shared goals and desires. These can 
all be understood in the structuralist framework as being either relations between nodes or 
 There is a striking similarity between arguments made in feminist standpoint epistemology and the points made here. 13
In standpoint theory, standpoints are not taken to be just given from being socially positioned (i.e., a member of  some 
oppressed feature group). For instance, Harding states “a standpoint can not be thought of  as an ascribed position with 
its different perspective that oppressed groups can claim automatically. Rather a standpoint is an achievement, something 
for which oppressed groups must struggle” (2004: 8). Hartsock argues “the vision available to the oppressed group must 
be struggled for and represents an achievement which requires both science to see beneath the surface of  the social 
relations in which all are forced to participate, and the education which can only grow from struggle to change these 
relations” (2004: 37).
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constraints on who (or what, when non-persons are at issues as in the case of  petitions) can occupy 
nodes.   14
 Is this the same group as that defined in terms of  oppressive power structures? Whether it is 
depends on the persistence conditions of  the feature group. The structure that involves relations of  
subordination and privilege and being assumed or imagined to have certain bodily features does not 
involve relations to laws. That structure does not require that one can be a member of  the group 
women only if  one aims to protect abortion rights or wants to make marriage accessible to 
everyone. The structures are different. The nodes are different. The group of  women engaged in 
identity politics is a distinct feature group! 
 Further, recall the two distinctions drawn in the last section. I claimed that many feature 
groups are nodes in covert and unintentionally instantiated social structures. In contrast, the group 
formed when engaging in identity politics is intentionally instantiated. Its instantiation involves 
political, social, and ethical work. The structure is also overt. Social factors (whether in terms of  
education, political engagement, coalition building, and so on) are relied on in identity politics and in 
the renegotiation of  identity that it involves.  
 While the feature group is distinct, it is still a group that is engaged in identity politics. The 
group is historically related to a group defined in terms of  oppressive relations. A group might be 
rooted in oppression in two ways.  First, it might constitutively depend on oppression. In this sense, 15
if  the relevant forms of  oppression are eliminated, the group ceases to exist. Second, a group might 
be rooted in oppression in a causal-historical sense. On this view, a group need not presently be 
oppressed in order to depend on oppression. Since the new feature group is not a node in an 
oppressive structure, it fails to be rooted in oppression in the first sense, but it still might be in the 
second sense.  
 There is a robust historical connection between the formation of  the new group, the group’s 
shared goals and interests, and the group’s political platform. When engaged in identity politics, one 
is aimed at using experiences to foster solidarity and construct new identities. Young argues that the 
sense of  identity relevant in identity politics involves “self-ascription as belonging to a group with 
others who similarly identity themselves, who affirm or are committed together to a set of  values, 
practices, and meanings” (1994: 734). The feature group involved in identity politics is distinct, but it 
 Young (1994) argues for a distinction between gender as seriality and gender as involving what she calls 14
groups in order to avoid essentialist worries. On my view, both serialities and groups (in her sense) are feature 
groups. Their differences rely largely on whether intentions are required. I do not take this to require a 
metaphysical difference in the nature of  the entities involved. 
 Thanks to Rebecca Mason for suggesting the two ways a group might be rooted in oppression.15
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is related in causal historical and material ways to a group based in oppression. It can be rightfully 
said to be engaged in identity politics without thereby reinforcing oppression. Views and distinctions 
from social metaphysics provide a new way to frame and understand the transformative response to 
the Reinforcement Problem.  
 We saw that feminist and critical theorists have argued for transformative solutions to 
avoiding RP. Their arguments are often explicitly anti-metaphysical. For instance, Weir argues that 
what she call ‘transformative identity politics’ should not focus on categories or groups like women 
or Blacks. Rather, it should focus on “identifying with,” which does not involve social categories or 
groups, but “identification with others, identification with values and ideals, identification with 
ourselves, as individuals and as collectives” (2008: 111). She argues that a shift from identity politics 
focused on groups or categories to a transformative identification-with model requires “a shift from 
a metaphysical to an ethical and political model of  identity” (ibid.). Metaphysics should be 
abandoned, Weir claims, as it reinforces identity politics that are rooted in categories that merely 
oppositional and cannot promote the needed solidarity. 
 I agree that an emphasis on transformation and on building relationships, platforms, and 
commitments are components of  how identity politics ought to be practiced, but I reject the notion 
that metaphysics is irrelevant or antithetical to anti-oppressive aims. The constitutive RP takes 
identity politics, in virtue of  its very nature, to reinforce social relations and identities that are 
subordinate and marginalized. It claims that certain political projects ensure that certain oppressive 
relations or groups persist. This is a metaphysical claim, which demands a (partially) metaphysical 
solution. 
 We saw how metaphysical theorizing about the nature of  social groups and social structures 
allows identity politics to avoid the Reinforcement Problem. New organized social groups or 
categories that are intentional, political, and based on interests, values, and relations come to be 
through the practice of  identity politics. Metaphysics need not be divorced from ethics or politics. 
Our options are not identity politics that merely reifies social groups that depend on bias and 
oppression or avoiding metaphysics all together. Rather, there is room for social metaphysics that is 
ethically and politically engaged. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Attending to social psychology and the metaphysics of  social groups reveals that identity politics 
need not be self-undermining. The Reinforcement Problem does not sink the entire possibility of  
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emancipatory identity politics. Even so, identity politics could be practiced in a way that promotes 
oppression. For instance, identity politics that is focused solely on white women or the arguments 
made by Incels (the shorthand term for a group of  so-called involuntary celibates) might reinforce 
oppression. Identity politics does not necessarily succumb to the Reinforcement Problem, but 
careful normative and political analysis is certainly still needed. 
 Focusing on social metaphysics in order to better understand and dissolve one argument 
against identity politics also revealed that metaphysics and political and normative projects need not 
be in tension. Recent work in social ontology requires us to rethink boundaries between sub-
disciplines. Normative and political concerns can be relevant to metaphysics and metaphysics can be 
relevant in normative and political projects. Social metaphysics has a role to play in vindicating 
identity politics from a central challenge. Work on ameliorative projects and in conceptual ethics or 
conceptual engineering poses another point at which ethics, politics, and metaphysics come together 
(Haslanger (2000), Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 2013b), Cappelen (2018)). By breaking down 
barriers, fruitful exchanges can be brought to the fore. 
 There are various other theoretical and practical problems that have been posed for identity 
politics that I have not addressed here. Some of  these might be solved through analyses involving 
social metaphysics. For instance, worries with essentializing or failing to be intersectional might 
benefit from metaphysical as well as ethical and political analyses. Other challenges might be beyond 
the scope of  an analysis relying on the nature of  social entities or might be unresolvable. 
Nevertheless, I have argued that taking social metaphysics seriously shows that one prominent 
argument problematizing identity politics as a liberatory strategy fails. 
 There is growing interest in social metaphysics within ontology. Social ontology is interesting 
in its own right. In addition, social metaphysics is metaphysics that can have a political and ethical 
upshot. It is not just metaphysics, but metaphysics that matters.  16
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